Gandzasar Monastery, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 1994

In the run-up to the long awaited summit between the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents next month in Paris, the London-based Conciliation Resources has just published a comprehensive report on the conflict over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh as well as the peace process and mood within the two respective societies to date. The unresolved conflict is seen as a major obstacle to peace and stability in the South Caucasus region as well as to the democratization process in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the region of Nagorny Karabakh has languished in a state of ‘no war, no peace’ for over a decade since the ceasefire of 1994. The conflict is a central obstacle to the political development of Armenia and Azerbaijan and a key impediment to the development of the South Caucasus region as a whole and its integration into the wider world. It is one of several conflicts between former federal units of the Soviet Union widely framed in terms of a clash between the principles of the self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states. Reference to these principles, understood in absolute terms rather than the more relativistic approach increasingly salient in international practice, continues to dominate the claims of the respective parties to the conflict. Armenia and the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh insist on sovereign self-determination for the latter, previously an autonomous unit within Soviet Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan insists on territorial integrity within its Soviet-era boundaries, offset by ill-defined autonomy for the Karabakh Armenians.

[…]

If nationalist conflicts defined the 1990s and structured the contours of the re-establishment of independent statehood in the South Caucasus, the current decade is being defined by state-society struggles over the forms that statehood should take. In recent years regimes in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been confronted with expressions of considerable discontent with the pace and reach of democratization. Lacking robust mandates, and having promoted a culture of homogenizing militancy in part as a result, political elites have left themselves little room for the compromises that any peace settlement must involve. On more than one occasion tentative agreement reached at the negotiating table has foundered when put before domestic audiences. As the articles by Musabayov and Tchilingirian argue, governments in both Azerbaijan and Armenia have sought to manipulate the ‘no peace, no war’ impasse for internal political gains, rather than to establish preconditions for its resolution. Finally Broers considers the impact of non-recognition on the political development and democratization process in Nagorny Karabakh itself. In short, throughout the region it seems that only democratic dividends deriving from improved state-society relations may ultimately furnish the necessary resources to break the current impasse in the peace process.

The comprehensive report follows one by the International Crisis Group and the ICG’s Sabine Freizer also has an article on what she sees as the last chance for peace in this one too.

In the autumn of 2005 Azerbaijan and Armenia seem to be as close to peace as they have ever been. But will the negotiations fail once again? If they do prospects for a resumption of large-scale combat are much more real than before. Burgeoning military expenditures, increasing ceasefire violations, and the demonization of the other side are all ominous signs that the time for talks is running out.

Since May 2004 the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers have met on eleven occasions in what has come to be known as the Prague Process. The countries’ presidents have expressed their support of the progress being made in their own tête-à-tête encounters. In August 2005 Minsk Group co-chairs apparently presented a one-page settlement strategy. If parties continue talks based on this discussion document, a comprehensive peace agreement may be ready in 2006.

[…]

Azerbaijan’s threat to employ force to restore its territorial integrity is real. Armenian hardliners argue that withdrawal from the security zone around Nagorny Karabakh is suicide, yet continual occupation of Azerbaijani territory while Baku is rapidly arming itself only provides justification for an Azerbaijani attack.

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Both Baku and Yerevan have an interest to reach a peace settlement soon. Otherwise they will have few levers to stop the wheels of war.

Armenian and Azerbaijani perspectives are provided by the Foreign Ministers of both countries and from within society as well as Nagorno Karabakh itself by various journalists and NGO heads including Laura Baghdasarian, wife of Hetq Online’s Editor-in-Chief and also head of Hetq’s Region Center, itself part of the Caucasus Journalists Network.

Azerbaijani Prisoner of War (PoW), Stepanakert, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 1994

There are also articles by two old friends from England — Tom de Waal, Caucasus Editor for the Institute of War & Peace Reporting and Hratch Tchilingirian. As reported by RFE/RL’s Armenia Service, as well as on my own blogs since the beginning of 2005, it would appear that momentum towards resolution of the Karabakh conflict is greater than at any time before — and that includes Key West in 2001.

Of course, there are still some very real and major obstacles to overcome so nothing is certain. The full report can be read online here.

Church Service, Stepanakert Theatre, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 1994

Refugee from Shahumian, Silikyan, Yerevan, Republic of Armenia © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 1994

Minefield, Askeran, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 2002

Settlers, Lachin, Kashatagh Region (Armenian-controlled territory between Armenia and Karabakh) © Onnik Krikorian / Oneworld Multimedia 2002