Anyway, re. economic growth, it’s undeniable although as in other former Soviet republics, the distribution of that wealth is questionable, especially when you consider that few can survive here on the income from one job alone. Plus, most economic growth is registered in only a few key areas thanks to the blockade, in my opinion. I’ve also pointed out that while the average salary in Yerevan is $200 a month, in Georgia it’s apparently $220.

Sure, chicken feed, but it is interesting how much progress was recorded in such a short period there, while in a sense, Armenia played catch up. Even growth in the State budget was a response to increases in Azerbaijan and Georgia. But, I suppose, that’s the reality of governments, especially in the post-Soviet space, and I’m not sure I could say that things would be better or worse if Kocharian wasn’t president.

On the other hand, I truly believe that accountability is vital for a government to do its job, and so democratic elections are necessary in order to facilitate that. Of course, I reserve judgment on that until the votes are in tomorrow in Georgia and the international communuity delivers its verdict on the conduct of the presidential election there.

In a sense, it is very relevant. Ter Petrosian came to power in clean elections, but then falsified to stay in office. Kocharian followed him in 1998 in relatively clean elections compared to 1996 , but again falsified in 2003. What will Saakashvili do, I wonder? I mean, democracy is a great thing in this part of the world when you know for sure you’ll win, but it’s something quite different when you don’t.

Let’s see what will be tomorrow, and then next month in Armenia.

As Observer translated, here’s how one local blogger interpreted Levon’s 21 September speech. Incidentally, it’s worth noting that the blogger in question is quite a well-reasoned and non-emotional media professional, but anyway.

Reporter_Arm speaks in greater detail about the meeting, and, noting, that people like the well known businessman: Khachatur Sukiasyan were also present at the event, finds it noteworthy, that Ter-Petrosyan dedicated a part of his speech to the word “oligarch”, saying this term shouldn’t be used, and that “They are businessmen and pay taxes, perhaps even more then they should. But you know whose pocket these taxes flow into”. The blogger speculates, that at this point Ter-Petrosyan is sending a message to the oligarchs, that in case of his election, their interests will be protected.

Therefore, while we can suppose that Armenia’s geopolitical orientation and foreign policy might change, what does this mean for the domestic situation? Okay, understood. Instead of paying “tributes” to Serzh and Kocharian the money will go into the State budget, but this is still a post-Soviet country. It’s not as if everything would be fine if only the leadership was changed.

Moreover, even if money was paid into the State budget, is he implying their positions and monopolies would not be touched as long as they remained “in his pocket” so to speak? I think this is also a question at the crux of the matter. As I know some of LTP’s team read this blog, perhaps they can respond to this? Thanks in advance.

On the other hand, if we can be so rational regarding the post-independence situation, especially as many of the aspects of Communist rule got carried over but then exaggerated without any checks and balances, can we not also be rational today? I mean, the argument is that there was “progress” of sorts during the 12 May parliamentary election, and as long as the international community is strict in expecting more progress next month, perhaps that’s also how things change.

I also wonder if corruption isn’t higher today not only because of the lack of a potent civil society and mass media, but also because there’s simply more money in circulation. On the other hand, I read an article on the election in Georgia which puts the average salary there at $220 a month. In Armenia, or actually Yerevan, I think it’s $200. Not much difference perhaps, but considering where Georgia was in 2003…

Anyway, two points I have to take exception to. Firstly, I do like Raffi Hovannisian, but when I refer to him that’s because it’s not me who talks so highly of him, it’s actually the population, especially among educated young Armenians, a group previously considered apathetic and fed up with the situation in Armenia. I also don’t think that you can categorically state that LTP is the best prospect for Armenia. If the argument is he made mistakes before with the people around him, deja vu anyone?

Still, you’re entitled to your personal opinion.

As for me, until candidates start speaking about concrete issues, I can’t see that any of them offer better prospects for Armenia unless their election is more democratic, they can be held accountable, and civil society and the mass media does its job for a change. And we also have to consider that parliament would still be pro-Serzh/Kocharian unless a massive purge of the Republican and Prosperous Armenia parties is on the agenda.

Anyway, so far we haven’t heard much about this from LTP, and this polarization between clans kind of makes mud-slinging and black PR more likely. In a sense, this is what this post is all about. It’s a call for some real campaigning. Then, as I’ve said in previous posts, I do believe the situation can change quite drastically. From speaking to many Armenians from different walks of life, Serzh is ahead in the opinion polls, but I think that this could also change if LTP actually campaigned like a real candidate.

Being surrounded by bodyguards, delivering academic speeches, and not actually allowing anyone close to him — including journalists — is not going to help his chances. Given that there will be Vahan Hovannisian and Artur Baghdasarian campaigning in more populist terms in a country such as Armenia, this could prevent LTP from getting enough votes to even make it through to a second round, in my opinion.

Anyway, as I’ve said before, I think the official pre-election campaign is going to be crucial, but for this election really to be democratic and for the electorate to really have a choice, we need the current pre-election atmosphere to change. Yes, I know, when there is a hostile pro-government media attacking LTP, that is not going to be easy, but the solution is also not to have a pro-radical opposition media do the same.

At the end of the day, I don’t care who wins — and that also means LTP or Serzh as well as other candidates — as long as the result reflects actual voting on election day, and that also means those voters who will take vote bribes. Both Serzh’s camp and Ter Petrosian’s still don’t know how to engage the population, but for the prime minister, that’s not so important. The situation is not as bad as it was in 1998, for example, and the State Budget is increasing.

It’s time for Ter Petrosian and other candidates to start really addressing important issues and for the population to determine whether there really is an alternative to Serzh. As it is, I think a larger group of people will go for Serzh, but not in enough numbers to see a first round victory. However, I am also not sure that Ter Petrosian is guaranteed to be the candidate to enter the second round, but even if he was, a few minor opposition parties supporting him is not enough for him to win.

Personally I think he needs a real broad-based opposition support — and that means Orinats Yerkir and Heritage.

You speak of ideology, but I have yet to hear of any so far. It’s more, Serzh is evil and Levon is good, or vice-versa. As some have already stated, that is not a choice, and not what should be put on offer to the population. Interestingly, I wonder who I’d vote for in this election if I were a citizen and I really don’t know. On the one hand, normalizing relations in the region would make me consider Ter Petrosian. On the other hand, as I’m not sure that things would change at all, I might consider Serzh for continuity’s and stability’s sake.

Vahan Hovannisian or Artur Baghdasarian? Well, the latter is populist, might be considered an option for his pro-Western credentials, but is too much of a demagogue in front of a crowd which puts me off. And even though I don’t subscribe to the ARF-D’s nationalist position, if Hovannisian really campaigns as it seems he might, I could be swayed over if he also offers real domestic and social-orientated policies. At the end of the day, however, I suspect I wouldn’t vote at all.

Still, that’s me, and not the bulk of the population who are being led to believe by the pro-government and pro-opposition press that there is only one choice. Levon or Serzh. Sorry, but that’s not an option and I do believe that for all the reasons given above, it looks likely that Serzh would win. Again, I have to say that the pre-election campaign has yet to start and this situation could change, but it can also change in many other ways too.

Let’s see.

You are right, VS and Vano could be considered a clan within LTP administration.
(Telman? dont make me laugh… total wealth of LTPs family + families of most of other members of Kharabakh committee is probably less than Dodi Gagos house paint.)
And I do not doubt RK and SS’s great contribution in Kharabakh war.
You also right, unfortunately, that people surrounding LTP these days are far from being trustful or outstanding in any good ways.
My main point was that it is difficult to avoid creation of clans in Armenia for objective reasons. After fall of USSR some people were destined to become rich and many poor, that was the logic of transition. And I do not know whom you would like to be see rich, but at the very beginning the chances were more or less even. I have been insider, and I can tell you that not all the people who were close to LTP or other members of first government became rich, but mostly those who had certain abilities. And I believe they would become what they are in spite who is the leader or in which country they live.
So, I argue, the election should boil down to other values, namely ideology.
What we have on the market today? it is LTP, pacifist, liberal, neither pro-american nor pro-russian. Dashnaks, whom I consider national-socialist, with all following consequences.
Vazgen Manukyan is ideologically close to LTP but I think he has been discredited as a good politician. RH…I know you like him, I do too, but he is too nationalistic to me and still lacks understanding of how things work in this country (you can translate this as he has no clans supporting him). AB is a populist (though his European orientation has a certain attractive appeal), but not popular enough to win, even if elections are free and fair. But his support may be crucial at the second round if it gets there. I do wish RH and AB where in team with LTP instead of Demirchyan and Sarkisyan, both far from being up to their father / brother.
SS - I really do not know what his ideology is or has he ?
I certainly don’t like RK manner of giving all keys of the economy to Russians in order to maintain his seat, and I think SS will be doing the same. I certainly do not want to see president of republic loosing part of national wealth in Monte Carlo, hoping to make the country rich some day by selling “Armenicum”. So, to me, it is not whether the richest armenian’s name is Grzo or Dodi Gago, but what are the prospects. And I think with LTP country has more prospects.

Anyway, like I said, in terms of politics and other walks of life, tight interconnected groups of people can be considered “clans” so actually, yes, we can talk of a “Ter Petrosian clan” although it is a grouping of other clans — Demirchian, Sarkisian etc. It’s also interesting to note the family and personal connections between key members of civil society and some media outlets with Ter Petrosian too.

Not to say that he’s alone in this. I mean, sure, the clan system defines government too, especially on a regional level. Anyway, the point is that the term “clan” means more than just family or origin based connections although that pretty much defines everything here. In fact, definitions 1,2 and 3 define opposition and government politics here.

Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)
clan /klæn/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[klan] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation
–noun

1. a group of families or households, as among the Scottish Highlanders, the heads of which claim descent from a common ancestor: the Mackenzie clan.

2. a group of people of common descent; family: Our whole clan got together for Thanksgiving.

3. a group of people, as a clique, set, society, or party, esp. as united by some common trait, characteristic, or interest: a clan of actors and directors.

4. Anthropology.
a. the principal social unit of tribal organization, in which descent is reckoned exclusively in either the paternal or the maternal line.
b. a group of people regarded as being descended from a common ancestor.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/clan

Basically, positions and influence were distributed based on personal connections under LTP (Sarkisian and Siradeghian/Sukiasian are representative of that). However, the influence of the military under Sarkisian also played a role in the redistribution of wealth. I don’t think any neutral observer can’t see that a new redistribution of wealth and property would occur in the event of regime change although I still wonder how a pro-Sarkisian/Kocharian parliament would influence that.

Anyway, political clans. Yes, I like that phrase. It sums up the situation in Armenia perfectly although I think that ARF-D, Orinats Yerkir and Heritage mark a departure from that. Which is why, of course, they are largely ignored by clan-affiliated representatives of civil society and the mass media on both sides of the political divide. I see no other explanation for that, I think. And this is the point. If the radical opposition can attack the pro-government media for not providing a level playing ground for Ter Petrosian, the pro-radical opposition media should understand that they’re not doing the same for other opposition candidates.

Indeed, the attacks on other opposition candidates from the radical opposition seems fiercer than that directed towards Ter Petrosian. In reality, a truly democratic election would see equal coverage of everyone. However, with this collection of political and economic former and present elites involved, we’re not getting that. That to me is a sign of clan politics. It is interesting, however, to note that none of these clans are new. They were part of the political system of the 1990s and they’re still being pushed by both respective sides as the choice on offer today.

There are of course parallels with the two party system in play in the U.S. and I suppsoe England although we have other parties represented in parliament, but the point is that there are other forces here that are being deprived of exposure because the way the political clan structure determines who civil society, the media, the radical opposition AND the government would like you to believe are the main forces. However, Impeachment failed in May 2007, and Orinats Yerkir and Heritage succeeded by campaigning.

I hope too that the pre-election campaign will also see actual campaigning play a role in determining the choice of the electorate rather than mutual mud-slinging between Ter Petrosian and Serzh Sarkisian/Robert Kocharian. Is it too much to ask?

Simply put, we need reasoned, objective and impartial reporting and analysis, and I’m simply explaining why you’re not going to get this. In a sense, this post is borne out of frustration and as it’s not an article or for any publication I think I’m allowed that luxury. Besides, it’s far less emotive than any article coming out of Armenia on the subject even as a blog post categorized and identified as a personal “Letter from Armenia.”

You’ll also notice that I posted this personal entry on my main blog and not on the Armenia Election Monitor 2008 because of that fact.

I’ve already mentioned how one “independent” online publication has Ter Petrosian’s campaign manager as its English language editor, and that one of its journalists was the former Deputy Head of Public TV as well as being involved in HHSh under the former president. However, such a situation gets frustrating when you consider the need for impartial information coming out at times of election. For example, during the 2007 parliamentary election I was doing some work for a major U.S. based internet publication.

However, given that its funding comes from OSI and is an extension of Soros, all of its contacts on the ground were pro-radical opposition. Thankfully, it’s coverage was objective enough, but I remember one conversation at a pre-election day dinner. “What about Impeachment/Aylentrank,” the editor who had arrived in Armenia asked? “Well, it’s obvious they’re linked to Ter Petrosian and HHSh,” I responded. “No,” a significant local journalist interrupted. “Nikol is my friend. He’s a good guy. It’s not true,” she said.

Fast forward to today and you can see who was right about Pashinian’s allegiances and this even despite the fact that Haykakan Zhamanak has always been considered a pro-Ter Petrosian paper. “And it’s funny to see Aram Sarkisian take on the role of a revolutionary,” I continued. “When I got here in 1998 his family controlled everything.” Another significant journalist and analyst sympathetic to Sarkisian angrily butted in. “That’s absurd. Ten years ago Aram was nothing.”

Well, nothing apart from part of the most powerful clan in Armenia at the time. Selective memory and an attempt to pevert recent history, in my opinion. As a result, I wrote this post just to inform readers of what I’ve seen and how I consider it since 1998. Whether you consider Ter Petrosian, the Sarkisians or Kocharian and Serzh worse or better, that’s up to you. Certainly, we can at least use this comments section to discuss that.

Thanks again for adding your two cents, because what we’re discussing might actually be what the electorate is come polling day.

However, the mindset of your average voter appears to consider that LTP represents a second “clan,” although “grouping” might be a better word of those formerly in power who used their positions to enrich themselves just as their counterparts at the top of the pile do today. The logic goes, and it’s not new and was also to be heard during the 2003 presidential election, was stick with what we’ve got now they’re fat enough. The alternative would start from scratch again.

However, my main point was that this is a battle between Levon’s people who want to get to the top again after formerly being there, and Kocharian/Serzh’s who want to remain . Most people say there is no difference, and a number of a small group of relatively neutral people even point to the fact that the system in place now is the one that Ter Petrosian created. Moreover, others point to more attacks on the press and the opposition/human rights activists than now, for example.

Of course, apathy in society and an impotent opposition nowadays might be reason for that. Nevertheless, the point is that there are pretty much no neutral or independent groups of people, including in civil society or the media, involved in this election. There is Levon’s clan or grouping, Kocharian and Serzh’s, and also Vazgen Manukian. Notice for example, that few are too concerned by Artur Baghdasarian and Raffi Hovannisian.

On that basis, as an emotive descriptive term to define how screwed up everything is here, I think the word “clan” is appropriate. The vicious attacks on those who even ask simple questions about Ter Petrosian’s time in office in Haykakan Zhamanak and other publications staffed by LTP associates, for example, is enough for that to ring true. On the other hand, while there was a lot of talk about the Karabakh clan from 1998, that seems to have softened since (apart from the radical opposition, of course).

Anyway, some of the points you mention have been noted. Thanks for the comment. However, when individuals such as Grzo rise to the top thanks to in-laws such as Vano, and now that they’re gone have lost their economic clout, but are no means poor, it really sickens me to see them portrayed by partisan media outlets as innocent victims. The same goes for Aram Sarkisian, and not least because his clan was the one effectively in power when I came here ten years ago.

Pro-government supporters also believe it most definitely was responsible for the assassination of Tigran Naghdalian, not that I was particularly happy about the way he used Pulic TV in the run-up to the 2003 vote. Anyway, at least you agree with the main point. Clans or rival political/economic groups — some in power and some that used to be — don’t offer the population the electorate the democratic choice it deserves.

Interestingly, although it might all change during the pre-election campaign, it’s not hard to understand that when given such a choice by such groups and the media or civil society, the population chooses either stability or vote bribes. For now, the main supporters of Ter Petrosian can be found in the radical opposition or in NGOs made up of individuals who were part of the system in the 1990s. It’s also interesting to note that LTP’s rallies are still made up largely of impoverished or elderly voters rather than the middle class or youth.

On that basis alone, I consider that LTP’s team is seen as a rival clan or grouping of those formerly in power who now want to return to their previous place in the sun. Interestingly, in such a circumstance, the number of people who appear to hate Serzh more than Ter Petrosian seems lower than those who hated Kocharian more than Demirchian in 2003. Indeed, during the last election, few actually hated him, remembering him as a good man and son of Karen.

Ter Petrosian is something different, and whether or not he himself is the same as the Karabakh or Ararat clan is secondary to the fact that this is how it’s shaping up. Anyway, let’s not forget Telman Ter Petrosian as well, or that many of his people soon jumped the sinking ship and sough self-preservation with Sarkisian or Kocharian. If we can talk about the Karabakh clan let’s also remember that many of those who remain in positions of influence at least started out during Ter Petrosian’s time in power.

As is the case now, anyone not part of that system had little choice but to leave the country. Even the mass media was reportedly the same. I mean, RFE/RL was then considered to be pro-opposition (including Dashnak) although unlike this government who attempted to introduce legislation to control its reach, LTP did actually take it off the air. Anyway, yes, it’s a personal opinion, but I believe that what Armenia needs now is new people and fresh ideas. Moreover, it needs a mass media and civil society that does its job.

However, apart from one visit to Karabakh in 1994 which saw me stay in Yerevan for a few days, I wasn’t here during LTP’s time in office. That said, there are few people apart from those who are linked to him personally now in positions within civil society or the mass media that talk about his time in power with any fondness. In fact, they seem rather dismissive of the former president.

True, a Karabakh victory was attained with him at the helm, although Vazgen Manukian, Vazgen Sarkisian, Samuel Babayan and Robert Kocharian can take as much credit for that, no? Indeed, seldom if at all have I heard that Levon Ter Petrosian was solely responsible for an Armenian victory which had as much to do with turmoil in Azerbaijan and Vazgen Sarkisian’s military leadership than anything else.

Anyway, if ideology formed the basis for the creation of the Karabakh movement and the first post-Soviet government, from speaking to people here that all seemed lost a few years later, and especially during and after the 1996 election. Still, like I said, I wasn’t here then, so comments from those that were are welcomed. Still, from 1988-99 the guys on top were not the Karabakh clan and Dodi Gago. They were the Sarkisians and Grzo (Khachatur Sukiasian).

you are very emotional, and it is not the best guide in the politics. Indeed, Armenia is a clan clad country given its near-asian background and size. So it is inevitable, and although I join you in wishes to see less of that after election, ordinary elector can not do much but choose between clans. Between two mentioned power poles the Kharabakh clan is the most dangerous, I think. First it really fits the definition of clan; they hail from the same region, they head the corresponding clan structures and they are not shy of using any means to reach their goal and destroy the opposition. They lack any ideological platform and their only aim is to keep milking the cow. Ter-Petrosian was different. He emerged as a leader of a group that has little in common, except the goal: salvation of Kharabakh and Independence of Armenia. Ironically a few now days acknowledge the fact that both important goals were accomplished during his rule. He himself never headed a clan that dominated republics economy. The group of people, namely Kharabakh committee, surrounding him were all powerful figures and as often happens after revolutionary changes (France, Russia) they start feuding between each other and as a result destroyed the best and many shady people came to the important positions. However it was not a pyramid of power subordinated to the president as it is now.
And most of the struggle with opposition, no matter how ugly it was conducted, was an ideological, not economical. After all the guy just resigned after could not convince people in his ideas….
I can not agree when people put them on a same scale.

Happy New Year